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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge: 
 
In previous criminal proceedings Eugene Hector 
successfully argued that several state tr oopers violated the 
Fourth Amendment when they seized over 80 pounds of 
hallucinogenic mushrooms from Hector's airplane in 
Dubois, Pennsylvania. Once the drugs were suppr essed and 
the prosecution dismissed, Hector initiated this S 1983 
action against the four appellants, Officers Gor don Watt, 
Alberto Diaz, Richard Davy, and Scott Hunter . The officers' 
request for qualified immunity has alr eady been denied and 
the order affirmed. Hector v. W att, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 
1999) (unpublished table decision). 
 
The narrow issue presented in this appeal is what type of 
damages Hector can obtain under the Fourth Amendment. 
Hector has abandoned any claim for damages fr om the 
search itself and instead seeks compensation solely for 
expenses he incurred during his criminal pr osecution-- 
$3,500 in bail-bond expenses, $23,000 in attor ney's fees, 
and $2,000 for travel between Pennsylvania and his home 
in California. The District Court held that Hector could not 
collect those litigation costs. We will affirm. 
 




The Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 creates a species of tort liability." Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2370 (1994) (quoting 
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 
305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542 (1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Given this close relation betweenS 1983 and tort 
liability, the Supreme Court has said that the common law 
of torts, "defining the elements of damages and the 
prerequisites for their recovery, pr ovide[s] the appropriate 
starting point for inquiry under S 1983 as well." Heck, 512 
U.S. at 483, 114 S.Ct. at 2370 (quoting Car ey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049 (1978)). The 
Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's 
S 1983 suit, which alleged that county pr osecutors and a 
state police officer destroyed evidence, used an unlawful 
voice identification procedure, and engaged in other 
misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could state a 
claim for those alleged violations, the Supr eme Court asked 
what common-law cause of action was the closest to the 
inmate's claim and concluded that "malicious pr osecution 
provides the closest analogy . . . because unlike the related 
cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, it permits 
damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal 
process." Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. at 2371. Looking 
to the elements of malicious prosecution, the Court held 
that the inmate's claim could not proceed because one 
requirement of malicious prosecution is that the prior 
criminal proceedings must have terminated in the 
plaintiff 's favor, and the inmate in Heck had not 
successfully challenged his criminal conviction. Id. 
 
Although Hector is not seeking damages for 
imprisonment following a conviction, as in Heck , he is still 
seeking to recover costs incurred while defending against a 
prosecution, relief that the common law made available 
exclusively under malicious prosecution. As the Supreme 
Court has explained, false arrest or imprisonment, the only 
other cause of action under the common law that could 
apply to a wrongful arrest and its consequences, provides 
damages "up until issuance of process or arraignment, but 
not more." Id. (quoting W . Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & 
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D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of T orts 888 (5th 
ed. 1984)). 
 
Given the Supreme Court's mandate that we look to 
similar common-law causes of action, Hector appears to be 
on the horns of a dilemma. If his claim is categorized as 
being like false arrest, then his claim fails because false 
arrest does not permit damages incurr ed after an 
indictment, excluding all the damages he seeks. But if his 
claim is treated as resembling malicious prosecution, then 
he would face the problem that a plaintif f claiming 
malicious prosecution must be innocent of the crime 
charged in the underlying prosecution."Even if the plaintiff 
in malicious prosecution can show that the defendant acted 
maliciously and without probable cause in instituting a 
prosecution, it is always open to the defendant to escape 
liability by showing in the malicious prosecution suit itself 
that the plaintiff was in fact guilty of the offense with which 
he was charged." Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 885 (citing 
Restatement of Torts S 657). This r equirement can bar 
recovery even when the plaintiff was acquitted in the prior 
criminal proceedings, for a verdict of not guilty only 
establishes that there was not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. 
 
Hector may believe, plausibly enough, that his claim is 
really more like a simple claim of tr espass. We agree that 
he has not in fact brought a claim for false arrest or 
malicious prosecution. And for that reason, we do not need 
to address the complexities of our jurisprudence on 
malicious prosecution under S 1983. Compare Torres v. 
McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 797 (2000) (rejecting a claim for 
malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment), with 
Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(reversing dismissal of a claim for malicious prosecution 
under the Fourth Amendment and holding that r estrictions 
on a plaintiff 's liberty post-indictment constituted a seizure 
triggering Fourth Amendment rights). See also Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S.Ct. 807, 807 (1994) 
(rejecting claim for malicious prosecution based on 
substantive due process); Merkle v. Upper Dublin School 
Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 792-93 (3d Cir . 2000) (discussing 
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Albright's impact on S 1983 claims for malicious 
prosecution). Other cases have evaluated various 
restrictions on malicious prosecution under S 1983. See, 
e.g., Wilson v. Russo, 212 F .3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997); Rose v. 
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
If Hector's claim is treated like trespass, however, then he 
fails to identify any common-law authority appr oving of the 
damages he seeks. His difficulty in finding authority is 
easily explained, for the exclusionary rule was not part of 
the common law. Justice Story stated this point plainly: "In 
the ordinary administration of municipal law the right of 
using evidence does not depend, nor, as far as I have any 
recollection, has ever been supposed to depend upon the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the mode, by which it is 
obtained. . . . [T]he evidence is admissible on charges for 
the highest crimes, even though it may have been obtained 
by a trespass upon the person, or by other for cible and 
illegal means." United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. 
Cas. 832, 843-44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). See also  Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Pr ocedure 20-25 
(1997) (reviewing historical evidence on the development of 
the exclusionary rule). 
 
Pointedly, Amar's book adds that a "two-century tradition 
of civil damage actions in America" prohibited a plaintiff 
who was subjected to an illegal search fr om collecting 
damages for any prosecution, conviction, and incarceration 
resulting from the search. Id.  at 27. The plaintiff was 
limited to damages for the search itself. Id. 
 
But analogies to the common law are not all that guide 
our decision. We do not venerate, for example, the common 
law rule that "upon marriage, the wife's identity merged 
with that of her husband. . . . plac[ing] the wife under a 
number of disabilities." Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 901. 
In Heck the Supreme Court said that the common law of 
torts was the starting point, not the only consideration, in 
analyzing a claim under S 1983. Thus, in justifying the 
result in Heck, the Court explained that allowing prisoners 
to challenge their convictions through S 1983 would 
undermine settled law of habeas corpus. Cf. Montgomery, 
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159 F.3d at 124 ("In determining whether a certain 
common law concept governs a section 1983 action, the 
[Supreme] Court has been guided by the extent to which 
the common law rule is rooted in history and r eason and 
whether the policies it serves are compatible with the 
purposes of section 1983."). Once we turn to these 
additional considerations, it is clear that Hector's claim 
must fail. 
 
One pivotal consideration is that in Car ey the Supreme 
Court stated that the damages available under S 1983 
depend on the type of constitutional right asserted: 
 
       [T]he elements and prerequisites for recovery of 
       damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by 
       the deprivation of one constitutional right ar e not 
       necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused 
       by the deprivation of another. As we have said, these 
       issues must be considered with refer ence to the nature 
       of the interests protected by the particular 
       constitutional right in question. 
 
Carey, 435 U.S. at 264-65, 98 S.Ct. at 1053. When we 
reflect on the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, we believe that it follows that a plaintiff 
cannot recover the litigation expenses incurr ed because 
police officers discovered criminal conduct during an 
unconstitutional search. As the Second Cir cuit has said in 
a case much like ours, "The evil of an unr easonable search 
or seizure is that it invades privacy, not that it uncovers 
crime, which is no evil at all." Townes v. City of New York, 
176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999). If Carey instructs that we 
should assess liability in terms of the risks that are 
constitutionally relevant, then damages for an unlawful 
search should not extend to post-indictment legal process, 
for the damages incurred in that process are too unrelated 
to the Fourth Amendment's privacy concerns. W e agree 
with Townes: "Victims of unr easonable searches or seizures 
may recover damages directly related to the invasion of 
their privacy--including (where appropriate) damages for 
physical injury, property damage, injury to r eputation, etc.; 
but such victims cannot be compensated for injuries that 
result from the discovery of incriminating evidence and 
consequent criminal prosecution." 176 F .3d at 148. 
 




Our conclusion that Carey and Heck require the result 
we reach is supported by the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule. The Supr eme Court 
has made clear in many cases that the exclusionary rule is 
not "a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 
2318 (1975) (quoting United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 
338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620 (1974)). As a result, the Court 
has recognized many exceptions where the exclusionary 
rule does not apply. 
 
Most recently, for example, the Supreme Court has said 
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to par ole 
revocation hearings. Pennsylvania Boar d of Probation and 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (1998). The 
Court has also refused to suppress evidence that police 
officers discovered when they were r easonably relying on a 
search warrant that was later held invalid, United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1985); r efused to apply 
the exclusionary rule in a civil deportation hearing, I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (1984); 
created a "public safety" exception to the timing of Miranda 
warnings, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 
2626 (1984); created an "inevitable discovery" exception to 
admit evidence that would have otherwise been excluded, 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984); 
allowed prosecutors to use during cross-examination 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912 
(1980); refused to exclude evidence obtained during an 
arrest pursuant to a statute later held unconstitutional, 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979); 
allowed the government to use in civil tax pr oceedings 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976); 
rejected relief under habeas corpus for Fourth Amendment 
violations, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 3037 
(1976); rejected retroactive application of a Supreme Court 
opinion concerning warrantless searches of cars, even 
though the petitioner's appeal was pending when the 
decision was announced, United States v. Peltier , 422 U.S. 
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531, 95 S.Ct. 2313 (1975); held that a witness befor e a 
grand jury could not refuse to answer questions that were 
based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 
S.Ct. 613 (1974); and allowed unlawfully seized evidence to 
be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who 
testified in his defense, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 
62, 74 S.Ct. 354 (1954). The list could go on. 
 
We are not of course drawing into question whether the 
exclusionary rule was properly applied in Hector's criminal 
case. The issue we must resolve is whether Hector can 
continue to benefit from the exclusionary rule in his S 1983 
suit and be relieved of defense costs fr om a prosecution 
that was terminated only because of the exclusionary rule. 
 
In deciding whether we will recognized this"continued" 
application of the exclusionary rule in Hector's civil suit, we 
must evaluate what other interests will be af fected by such 
an extension of the rule. The Supreme Court invoked this 
broader perspective in Stone: 
 
       The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly that the 
       policies behind the exclusionary rule are not absolute. 
       Rather, they must be evaluated in light of competing 
       policies. In that case, the public interest in 
       determination of truth at trial was deemed to outweigh 
       the incremental contribution that might have been 
       made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
       application of the rule. 
 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 488, 96 S.Ct. at 3049. 
 
Many of the cases cited above, such as Stone, emphasize 
that the point of the exclusionary rule is to deter violations 
of the Fourth Amendment and then conclude that applying 
the exclusionary rule to the class of cases befor e the Court 
--habeas cases, for example--would not significantly 
increase the deterrent effect of the rule. 
 
Under this logic, Hector can reasonably ar gue that 
imposing substantial financial liability on officers would 
add measurably to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary 
rule. And while the loss to the truth-seeking function of 
trials (the countervailing consideration often cited by the 
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Supreme Court) may be a persuasive reason for admitting 
evidence already discovered, the truth-seeking function of 
trials is a much less convincing reason for opposing greater 
deterrence of future constitutional violations. Once we 
agree that the police should adhere to the Fourth 
Amendment, we must accept that the police will for ego 
evidence that only would have been discovered through an 
unconstitutional search. 
 
Despite these arguments supporting greater deterrence, 
Stone tells us that there are a variety of policy concerns to 
weigh. One policy concern in our case is that the 
magnitude of the liability that Hector's theory would impose 
would often have very little to do with the seriousness of 
the Fourth Amendment violation. What is often obscur ed by 
the Fourth Amendment's prominent role in criminal 
proceedings is that, as Townes suggested, we judge the 
gravity of Fourth Amendment violations not by the 
probative value of the evidence uncover ed, but by the 
degree of the privacy invasion. 
 
For example, if police officers barged into someone's 
house without a warrant or probable cause, ransacked all 
the rooms, and on a whim shot the homeowner's dogs, that 
would be a very serious invasion of privacy, r egardless of 
whether evidence of criminal wrongdoing was unearthed. If 
on the other hand an officer who was conducting a lawful 
frisk of someone decided to open a small package, like a 
wallet, when there was insufficient justification for doing 
so, the officer's unconstitutional search would cause only a 
minimal intrusion of privacy, even if it uncover ed evidence 
of massive criminal wrongdoing, leading to pr otracted and 
expensive criminal prosecutions. 
 
Under Hector's theory, however, the officer who took a 
frisk one modest step too far could face vast liability, 
liability that bears no relationship to the seriousness of the 
invasion of privacy. We recognize that tort law does not 
require that damages remain strictly proportional to fault; 
the famous eggshell-skull rule is an illustration. See, e.g., 
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co, 130 F .3d 1287, 1294 (8th 
Cir. 1997); Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, 49 F.3d 
1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). Another example is that a 
tortfeasor pays more in lost wages when the injured victim 
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has a higher income. And the Supreme Court has endorsed 
the rule that courts "should read [S 1983] against the 
background of tort liability that makes a man r esponsible 
for the natural consequences of his actions." Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 n.7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098 n. 
7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 197, 81 
S.Ct. 473, 484 (1961)). 
 
But these considerations are not decisive. As Heck 
emphasized, we are evaluating liability in a context where 
the common law would not allow damages for false arr est 
after an indictment and would prevent a plaintiff who was 
in fact guilty from obtaining relief for malicious 
prosecution. We are also considering liability that bears at 
best a tenuous connection to the interests pr otected by the 
Fourth Amendment. Because the caselaw makes clear that 
we should keep in mind the interests pr otected by the 
constitutional provision, and should weigh competing 
policies in designing remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations, we think it is reasonable to r ecognize that the 
liability Hector seeks under S 1983 could often have little 
relation to the seriousness of the Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
 
Our point is not that officers should be fr ee from liability 
for invasions of privacy, or even for comparatively minor 
ones. We are assuming here that a constitutional violation 
occurred and qualified immunity does not apply. The point 
is that given the social importance of police enfor cement, 
we think it is irresponsible to impose potential liability out 
of proportion to the errors committed. The resources any 
community has to devote to police protection ar e scarce, 
and Hector's way of calibrating liability would misallocate 
those limited resources by focusing on the wrong types of 
errors, while at the same time having the unfortunate 
consequence of reducing the cost of misconduct to 
criminals. To allow damages so out of pr oportion to the 
privacy invasion would not be consistent with the br oad 
principles animating qualified immunity. See, e.g., Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). 
 
We also think it is significant that all of the scholarly 
authority that we have found runs against Hector's 
position. See Akhil Reed Amar, supra, at 27-29; Douglas 
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Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 
143 (2d ed. 1994); William J. Stuntz, W arrants and Fourth 
Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881, 900-01 (1991); 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations, 
75 Va. L. Rev. 1461, 1474-76 (1989); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials 88 Colum. L. Rev. 247, 270 (1988); Richard A. 
Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 49, 50-53. 
 
We recognize that a district court opinion in this circuit 
has held that a plaintiff who was convicted as a result of an 
illegal search could seek post-indictment damages for his 
conviction and incarceration solely on the basis of the 
illegal search. See Carter v. Georgevich, 78 F. Supp.2d 332 
(D.N.J. 2000). But we do not find the reasoning of that case 




The officers have argued that proximate causation 
provides an alternative ground for affirming. More 
specifically, they claim that the prosecutor's and grand 
jury's decisions to indict Hector were super ceding or 
intervening causes that broke the causal connection 
between the Fourth Amendment violation and Hector's 
subsequent expenses in mounting a legal defense. 
 
The officers are correct that we have applied the common 
law of proximate causation to S 1983 claims, see, e.g., 
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000), and in 
particular that we have applied the concept of intervening 
causes to a S 1983 action for Fourth Amendment violations. 
See Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
In Bodine, for example, the plaintif f alleged that police 
officers illegally entered his house and used excessive force 
as they tried to arrest him. We held that the illegal entry 
did not make the officers automatically liable for any 
injuries caused by the arrest. Invoking pr oximate 
causation, we explained that if the officers' use of force was 
reasonable given the plaintiff 's acts, then despite the illegal 
entry, the plaintiff 's own conduct would be an intervening 
cause that limited the officers' liability. For the plaintiff to 
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recover all the damages he sought, we said that he had to 
prove two torts--one for the illegal entry and a second for 
excessive force. 
 
While Bodine's insistence that the plaintif f must prove 
two torts bears some family resemblance to our conclusion 
that Hector cannot use the illegal search alone to obtain 
relief for what is in essence a claim for malicious 
prosecution, Bodine's superceding cause does not apply 
here. The officers are not alleging that any of Hector's 
conduct counts as an intervening cause; instead, they 
claim that the prosecutor's and grand jury's decisions to 
indict were the intervening cause. 
 
The problem with the officers' theory is that there is a 
great deal of tension in the caselaw about when official 
conduct counts as an intervening cause. The Second 
Circuit has carefully described these tensions in a recent 
opinion, Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349-55 (2d Cir. 
2000), and observed that the most closely analogous 
Supreme Court decision rejected a pr oposed intervening 
cause. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 344-45 n.7, 106 
S.Ct. at 1098 n.7. The plaintiff in Malley  had brought a 
S 1983 suit against a police officer for submitting 
insufficient evidence for a search warrant. In allowing the 
plaintiff 's suit to proceed, the Supr eme Court expressly 
stated that the judicial officer's decision to issue a warrant 
did not break the "causal chain between the application for 
the warrant and the improvident arrest." Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. at 344-45 n.7, 106 S.Ct. at 1098 n.7. 
 
Not long after Malley, the Second Cir cuit rejected that a 
prosecutor or grand jury's decision was an intervening 
cause. See White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1988) 
("As with the grand jury . . . the public pr osecutor's role in 
a criminal prosecution will not necessarily shield a 
complaining witness from subsequent civil liability where 
the witness's testimony is knowingly and maliciously 
false."). The Second Circuit has also held that a sentencing 
judge's decision did not break the causal chain between the 
wrongful recommendation of a probation officer and an 
unconstitutional sentence. Warner v. Orange County Dep't 
of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 1997), reinstated 
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after opinion vacated, 173 F.3d 120, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 495 (1999). 
 
By contrast, in Townes the Second Cir cuit found that a 
judge's decision not to suppress evidence was an 
intervening cause, see 176 F.3d at 146-47, and the Fifth 
Circuit has held that the decisions of an FBI agent, 
prosecutor, and grand jury acted as an intervening cause. 
See Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (5th Cir. 1988). 
The Ninth Circuit has likewise invoked a pr osecutor's 
decision as an intervening cause. Smiddy v. V arney, 665 
F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir. 1981), adhered to, 803 F.2d 
1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). And Zahr ey listed many 
more cases, yielding few coherent principles. 
 
As we recently observed, albeit not in the context of 
S 1983 actions, the Supreme Court "has repeatedly noted 
that `proximate cause is hardly a rigor ous analytic tool.' " 
Steamfitters Local, 420 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 
922 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 
U.S. 465, 477 n.13, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2547 n. 13 (1982)). 
Given that the cases on intervening causes ar e legion and 
difficult to reconcile, as Zahrey  shows, and that we have 
other, sufficient grounds for r esolving this case, we will not 
reach the issue of intervening causation. W e have no reason 
to use this case as a vehicle for effectively deciding, for 
example, that a S 1983 plaintiff who was the victim of 
fabricated evidence can never sue for damages incurr ed 
after a prosecutor's decision to indict. W e leave such 




For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment 
of January 25, 2000, will be affirmed.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. After Hector abandoned all claims for damages from the stop itself, the 
officers requested in their motion for summary judgment that the 
District Court enter a one-dollar award in Hector's favor as nominal 
damages for the Fourth Amendment violation. W e need not address the 
propriety of that award, given Hector's abandonment of all compensable 
damages and given that the officers themselves sought the award and 
did not cross-appeal from it. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring : 
 
While I agree with the majority's conclusion that Hector 
cannot recover the expenses he incurred as a result of his 
criminal prosecution, I would reach this disposition more 
directly via a causation analysis. 
 
I must first recount the relevant facts. Officers Watt, 
Diaz, Davy, and Scott unlawfully detained Hector , his 
companion, and his personal aircraft at the 
Dubois/Jefferson County airport for several hours without 
a warrant. The officers did, however, ultimately obtain a 
warrant from a magistrate and it was only after they 
secured this warrant that they searched Hector's aircraft 
and recovered eighty-one pounds of hallucinogenic 
mushrooms. Based exclusively on this seized contraband, 
Hector was charged in state court with possession with the 
intent to distribute the controlled substance. The charges 
were withdrawn in state court after a federal grand jury 
indictment, and Hector filed a motion to suppr ess the 
seized mushrooms based on the officers' violation of his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unr easonable 
searches and seizures. The District Court granted Hector's 
motion to suppress after a four day hearing, and the 
charges against Hector were withdrawn. 
 
Hector commenced a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 to recover the expenses incurr ed pursuing his 
Fourth Amendment claim. The District Court granted 
summary judgment against the officers' attempts to shield 
themselves from Hector's claim with the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, and we affirmed. Hector v. Watt, No. 
99-3355 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 1999) (per curium). With the 
officers' liability for violating Hector's Fourth Amendment 
right established, and their entitlement to qualified 
immunity blocked, the S 1983 claim was r emanded to the 
District Court to determine damages. The District Court 
filed a one paragraph order granting the officers' motion for 
summary judgment and stating that "as a matter of law . . . 
the damages recoverable by plaintiff for defendant's 
violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 are 
limited to nominal damages of $1.00." 
 
Individuals may bring civil claims for damages r esulting 
from violations of their Fourth Amendment rights under 
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S 1983. See Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). We have 
recognized that "Section 1983, Title 42 U.S.C.A., is 
completely silent as to the kind of damages which may be 
awarded an injured plaintiff in a civil right suit," Basista v. 
Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir . 1965), and the Supreme 
Court has held that S 1983 damages "may include . . . out- 
of-pocket loss and other monetary harms." Memphis Cmty. 
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 
2543 (1986). Actions brought under S 1983 are reviewed 
like common law tort claims and require a proximate cause 
analysis. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 
2364 (1994); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042 
(1978); Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 
The dispositive question, therefore, is whether the 
officers' illegal search and seizure of Hector's aircraft 
proximately caused the expenses related to Hector's 
suppression hearing. The first stage of a causation analysis 
requires a finding that the violation caused the damages in 
fact, and I need not belabor this portion of the analysis 
since "but for" the officers' illegal sear ch Hector would not 
have been detained, searched, and prosecuted. Because the 
charges against Hector rested entir ely upon the illegally 
seized drugs, without the officers' violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights none of the subsequent criminal 
proceedings would have occurred. 
 
The issue of proximate cause, however, r equires closer 
analysis. Unlike causation in fact, proximate causation is a 
legal construct fashioned according to policy 
considerations. As Justice Andrews stated in his classic 
dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 
(N.Y. 1928), "[w]hat we mean by the word `proximate' is 
that, because of . . . public policy . . . the law arbitrarily 
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point." 
The causal chain traced by a proximate cause analysis can 
be broken by an intervening or superceding cause, which 
Prosser and Keeton describe as "an act of a third person or 
other force which by its intervention pr events the actor 
from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent 
negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTSS 440 (1965). 
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The majority eschews this issue, stating that "[g]iven that 
the cases on intervening causes are legion and difficult to 
reconcile . . . and that we have other, sufficient grounds for 
resolving this case, we will not reach the issue of 
intervening cause." Considering the facts befor e us, I find 
the causation analysis less daunting. 
 
Three events might be considered to br each the chain of 
causation between the initial illegal detention (occurring 
before the issuance of the warrant) and the damages Hector 
subsequently incurred defending his Fourth Amendment 
rights and successfully suppressing the seized contraband: 
1) the magistrate's issuance of a warrant; 2) the 
prosecutor's decision to pursue the char ge; and 3) the 
federal grand jury's indictment. Admittedly, the causation 
analysis would be difficult if we were to consider only the 
decision to prosecute and the grand jury indictment as 
possible intervening causes since parallel and contradictory 
jurisprudence has developed on this issue. Compare 
Townes v. City of New York, 176 F .3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 
1999) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that the chain of 
causation between a police officer's unlawful arr est and a 
subsequent conviction and incarceration is br oken by the 
intervening exercise of independent judgment"), Barts v. 
Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir . 1989) (finding that 
intervening decisions of prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and 
jury supervene), Hand v. Gary, 838 F .2d 1420, 1427-28 
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding that a decision of a magistrate or 
grand jury supervenes), Smiddy v. Var ney, 665 F.2d 261, 
266-68 (9th Cir. 1981), Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 
183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that a decision of a grand 
jury supervenes), and Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 
(7th Cir. 1972) (finding that a ruling of a sentencing judge 
supervenes), with Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr ., Inc. v. 
McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir . 1994), Hale v. Fish, 899 
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1990), Boruda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 
1384 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (stating that a "plaintiff who 
establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional rights 
actionable under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 is entitled to recover 
compensatory damages for all injuries suffer ed as a 
consequence of those deprivations" and holding that the 
decision to prosecute the charge did not supervene), Kerr v. 
City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1142 (7th Cir. 1970) 
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(stating that a "plaintiff in a civil rights action should be 
allowed to recover the attorneys' fees in a . . . criminal 
action where the expenditure is a for eseeable result of the 
acts of the defendant."), Carter v. Geor gevich, 78 F.Supp.2d 
332, 334 (D.N.J. 2000) (stating that "[r]ather than the acts 
of a prosecutor and judge being consider ed intervening 
causes which interrupted or destroyed the causal 
connection between the wrongful act and injury to the 
plaintiff, it appears to the Court that such subsequent acts 
were reasonably foreseeable by the officer. A tortfeasor is 
not relieved from liability for his wr ongful conduct by the 
intervention of third persons if these acts ar e reasonably 
foreseeable"), Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F.Supp. 605, 621 
(D.Mass. 1982), Lykken v. Vavr eck, 366 F.Supp. 585 
(D.Minn. 1973), Brooks v. Moss, 242 F .Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 
1965), and McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F .Supp. 420 
(E.D.Tenn. 1963). We need not r econcile this caselaw, 
however, because the magistrate issued a sear ch warrant 
before the officers recovered the contraband, and this act of 
independent judgment breaks the chain of causation 
between the illegal detention and Hector's subsequent legal 
costs. 
 
As the majority recognized, the most dir ectly pertinent 
Supreme Court decision is Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 
106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986). In Malley, the Court considered an 
officer's liability under S 1983 for pr esenting an insufficient 
affidavit to a judicial officer who issued a warrant resulting 
in the plaintiff 's arrest. The Court rejected the District 
Court's reasoning that the judicial officer's decision to issue 
the warrant, despite lacking necessary infor mation, broke 
the "causal chain between the application for the warrant 
and the improvident arrest." The Court stated that "a 
reasonably well-trained officer in [the same] position would 
have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable 
cause," and an "officer then cannot excuse his own default 
by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate." 
Id. at 345, 346 n.9. Three points should be taken from 
Malley. 
 
First, a magistrate's issuance of a warrant, generally, 
does not necessarily insulate an officer fr om damages that 
occur as a result of illegal activity that takes place before 
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the receipt of the warrant. Second, the operative 
determination for the Court was whether the officer should 
have foreseen that his violation would pr oduce the damage 
to the plaintiff, and in Malley this question was specifically 
whether the officer should have known that his submission 
of the insufficient affidavit would result in the arrest. For 
the officers here, surely they could have foreseen that their 
violation (illegally detaining Hector) could r esult in the 
damages (legal fees). 
 
Third, Malley is distinguishable fr om the facts here 
because the officer's violation in Malley pertained directly to 
the magistrate's inability to make an independent judgment 
regarding the warrant. The warrant in Malley was not the 
result of a truly independent decision by a magistrate, but 
rather was contaminated and compromised by the officer's 
misinformation. This requirement that a decision of a 
prosecutor, sentencer, or other court officials will only 
constitute an intervening cause if the decision is genuinely 
free from deception or coercion is enforced by several 
Courts of Appeal. See Townes, 176 F .3d at 147 (stating that 
an exercise of independent judgment breaks chain of 
causation "in the absence of evidence that the police officer 
misled or pressured the official who could be expected to 
exercise independent judgment"); Myers v. County of 
Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 1998); Barts v. Joyner, 
865 F.2d 1187, 1197 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding intervening 
acts break chain of causation "in the absence of a showing 
that the police officers deceived the court officials or unduly 
pressured them or that the court officials themselves acted 
with malice and the police joined with them."); Jones v. City 
of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir . 1988) ("[A] 
prosecutor's decision to charge, a grand jury's decision to 
indict, a prosecutor's decision not to dr op charges but to 
proceed to trial--none of these decisions will shield a police 
officer who deliberately supplied misleading infor mation 
that influenced that decision."); Lanier v. Sallas, 777 F.2d 
321, 325 (5th Cir. 1985); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). 
Although here the warrant arrived too late to excuse the 
initial detention, Hector has suffered no damages as a 
result of that detention. Otherwise, the independence of the 
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magistrate's judgment was not compromised in any way. 
Malley is therefore materially distinguishable. 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offers two persuasive 
opinions holding that "if the facts supporting an arrest are 
put before an intermediate such as a magistrate or grand 
jury, the intermediate's decision breaks the causal chain," 
Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(en banc); Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1982), 
and a third stating that "even an officer who acted with 
malice in procuring the warrant . . . will not be liable if the 
facts supporting the warrant or indictment ar e put before 
an impartial intermediary." Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 
1427 (5th Cir. 1988). The Hand Court also emphasized, in 
accordance with Malley, that the chain of causation is only 
broken where all the facts are pr esented to the independent 
intermediary or where an officer's indiscretion does not 
cause any relevant information to be withheld from the 
independent intermediary. As Hand summarized, any 
"misdirection of the magistrate or the grand jury by 
omission or commission perpetuates the taint of the 
original official behavior." Id. at 1428. Several district courts 
have followed these three Fifth Circuit opinions on this 
issue. See Johnson v. Davenport, 2000 WL 341255 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000); Paddio v. City of Hammond, 1997 WL 289704 
(E.D. La. 1997); Hamrick v. City of Eustace, 732 F.Supp. 
1390 (E.D.Tex.1990); Taylor v. City of Nederland, Tex., 685 
F.Supp. 616 (E.D. Tex. 1988); V on Williams v. City of Bridge 
City, Tex., 588 F.Supp. 1187 (E.D. Tex. 1984); Farmer v. 
Lawson, 510 F.Supp. 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 
There is nothing in the record to indicate, nor have the 
parties claimed, that the officers undermined the 
magistrate's independence of judgement and autonomous 
determination to issue the warrant. Absent any such 
subterfuge, and in conjunction with the decision of the 
prosecutor, the grand jury indictment, and the general 
policy concerns expressed in the majority opinion, I would 
find that the officers do not bear legal r esponsibility for the 
costs accrued after the initial illegal detention. 
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